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Abstract 
Recent events have highlighted the difficulties the Internal Revenue Service faces 
when attempting to ensure that purportedly tax-exempt organizations in fact qualify for 
that status.  The problems in this area go much deeper than a group of IRS employees 
subjecting certain organizations to greater scrutiny based on their political leanings, 
however.  For decades members of the public, the media, the academy, and Congress have 
criticized the limited ability of the IRS to ensure that organizations claiming exemption 
from federal income tax in fact deserve that categorization.  Yet examples of IRS failings 
in this area continue to arise with depressing frequency.  This is not surprising given that 
oversight of exempt organizations is but one of many areas that suffers from major 
difficulties faced by the IRS as a whole, including shrinking resources, growing 
responsibilities, and increasing responsibility for determinations that go beyond those 
necessary for revenue collection.  This Article draws on tax compliance literature to 
explore how the current level and methods of oversight for exempt organizations could be 
modified to improve compliance even given the existing resource constraints.  It concludes 
that while marginal improvements in oversight are possible, there is no silver bullet to 
counter the IRS’s growing inability to oversee this area.  Part IV of this Article therefore 
turns to more radical proposals that would move the locus of oversight for exempt and 
particularly charitable organizations out of the IRS.  The proposal that shows the most 
promise, but also is the most risky, would shift much of this role to a private, self-regulatory 
body overseen by the IRS.  Given the current state of IRS oversight, this proposal deserves 
serious consideration.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Recent events have highlighted the difficulties the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
faces when attempting to ensure that purportedly tax-exempt organizations do in fact 
qualify for that status.1  These problems go much deeper than a group of IRS employees 
subjecting certain organizations to greater scrutiny based on their political leanings.  For 
decades, members of the public, the media, the academy, and Congress have criticized the 
limited ability of the IRS to ensure that organizations claiming exemption from federal 
income tax in fact deserve that categorization.2  Yet examples of IRS failings in this area 
continue to arise with depressing frequency despite numerous suggestions for improvement 
and various congressional and agency initiatives. 3   This is consistent with the major 
difficulties faced by the IRS as a whole and discussed by other presenters at this 
symposium.4  As detailed in Part II of this Article, these difficulties have rendered the IRS 
unable to keep pace with the growth of the exempt organizations sector over the past 40 
years. 
One of the latest such initiatives suggests a new approach, however.  In 2014, the 
IRS introduced the much shorter and simpler Form 1023-EZ application for nonprofit 
organizations that claim exempt charitable status and expect to have only modest financial 
resources, accompanied by faster procedures for handling all applications for recognition 
of exemption.5  These innovations represent the first significant, permanent reduction in 
the level of oversight the IRS provides in this area since the introduction of the Form 990-
EZ, a shorter version of the annual information return required for most exempt 
organizations.6  It is arguable, however, whether a reduction of oversight is in fact prudent 
and whether other reductions might also be advisable.  Part III of this Article draws on tax 
compliance literature to explore how the current level and methods of oversight for exempt 
organizations could be modified to improve compliance given existing resource 
constraints.  It concludes that while marginal improvements in oversight are possible, there 
is no silver bullet to counter the IRS’s growing inability to oversee this area. 
Part IV of this Article therefore turns to more radical proposals that would move 
the locus of oversight for exempt and particularly charitable organizations out of the IRS.  
The proposal that shows the most promise, but also is the most risky, would shift much of 
this role to a private, self-regulatory body overseen by the IRS.  The current crisis, however, 
highlights the need to pursue this proposal now. 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF IRS OVERSIGHT 
In theory, oversight of exempt organizations by the IRS and its predecessors is as 
old as the Internal Revenue Code itself.7  In practice, there appears to have been little actual 
oversight until Congress began requiring an annual information return for some exempt 
                                                      
1 See S. REP. NO. 114-119, at 60 (2015); Lily Kahng, The IRS Tea Party Controversy and 
Administrative Discretion, 42 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 41, 42-44, 49-51 (2013); Paul Caron, The IRS 
Scandal, TAXPROF BLOG, http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/irs-scandal [http://perma.cc/FS8W-7T8H]. 
2 See infra Part III.A. 
3 Id. 
4 See Memorandum from J. Russell George, Inspector General, Dep’t of the Treasury, to Jacob 
Lew, Sec’y of the Treasury 1-2 (Oct. 15, 2014), https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/management/management 
_fy2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/WMP4-GXHG]. 
5 See FORM 1023-EZ, STREAMLINED APPLICATION FOR RECOGNITION OF EXEMPTION UNDER SECTION 
501(C)(3) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, http://www.irs.gov/uac/About-Form-1023EZ [http://perma.cc 
/23VW-QGJR]. 
6 See IRS Announcement 89-34, 1989-10 I.R.B. 30. 
7 See Act of Oct. 3, 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, § 2(G)(a), 38 Stat. 114, 172 (1913). 
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organizations effective as of 1943. 8   Furthermore, Congress did not require that any 
organizations apply to the IRS for recognition of their exempt status until it imposed this 
requirement on many charitable organizations in 1969.9 
This Part describes these two main channels for IRS oversight of exempt 
organizations: consideration of applications for recognition of exemption and examinations 
of annual information returns.  It also reviews the other significant exempt organization 
related activities engaged in by the IRS, such as providing various forms of guidance, 
rulings, and technical advice, and the limited evidence regarding the current level of 
compliance by exempt organizations with the applicable federal tax laws.  First, it is useful 
to consider both the extent to which the size of the regulated community has grown over 
time and the resources the IRS directs to overseeing this community, which have not kept 
pace. 
A. Exempt Organizations and the IRS Exempt Organizations Division 
The following two tables show the IRS-reported numbers and aggregate assets and 
revenues for exempt organizations, both generally and specifically for charitable (I.R.C. 
§ 501(c)(3)) organizations and the most numerous non-charitable organizations (I.R.C. 
§ 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations; I.R.C. § 501(c)(5) labor, agricultural, and 
horticultural organizations; I.R.C. § 501(c)(6) business leagues, chambers of commerce, 
and similar entities; I.R.C. § 501(c)(7) social and recreational clubs; and I.R.C. § 501(c)(8) 
fraternal beneficiary organizations).  
                                                      
8 See Revenue Act of 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-285, § 117, 58 Stat. 21, 36-37 (1944); H.R. REP. No. 78-
871, at 24-25 (1943); S. REP. No. 78-627, at 21 (1943).  The Treasury Department imposed an annual 
information return requirement in 1942 on certain exempt organizations, effective for tax year 1941, although 
it was not clear it had the authority to do so.  See T.D. 5125, 1942-1 C.B. 101 (codified at Treas. Reg. 103, 
§ 19.101-1), as modified by T.D. 5177, 1942-2 C.B. 123; MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING 
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 65 (2004). 
9 See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 101(a), 83 Stat. 487, 494-96 (1969) (codified 
at I.R.C. § 508); H.R. REP. NO. 91-431, pt. 1, at 37 (1969); S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 53 (1969).  Treasury by 
regulation provided an application process before 1969, but it is not clear if Treasury sought to make this 
process mandatory.  See, e.g., T.D. 2693, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 293 (1918); T.D. 5125, 1942-1 C.B. 101 
(codified at Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.101-1); Philip Hackney, Should the IRS Never “Target” Taxpayers? An 
Examination of the IRS Tea Party Affair, 49 VAL. U. L. REV. 453, 460-61 (2015). 
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Table 1: Exempt Organizations: Numbers10 
Fiscal 
Year All 501(c)s 501(c)(3)s 501(c)(4)-(8)s Other 501(c)s 
1980 846,433 319,842 453,415 73,176 
1985 854,806 366,071 412,877 75,858 
1990 1,022,214 489,882 443,066 89,266 
1995 1,162,810 626,226 439,424 97,160 
2000 1,354,395 819,008 431,965 103,422 
2005 1,570,023 1,045,979 421,410 102,634 
2010 1,821,824 1,280,739 437,581 103,504 
2011 1,494,882 1,080,130 330,336 84,416 
2012 1,484,818 1,081,891 320,029 82,898 
2013 1,442,197 1,052,495 310,126 79,576 
2014 1,568,454 1,117,941 369,41611 81,097 
  
                                                      
10 See IRS 1980 ANN. REP. 76; IRS 1986 ANN. REP. 60; IRS ANN. REP. 1990, at 38; IRS DATA BOOK 
1995, at 25; IRS DATA BOOK 2000, at 24; IRS DATA BOOK 2005, at 40; IRS DATA BOOK 2010, at 56; IRS 
DATA BOOK 2011, at 56; IRS DATA BOOK 2012, at 56; IRS DATA BOOK 2013, at 56; IRS DATA BOOK 2014, at 
58. 
11 The sharp increase from fiscal year 2013 to fiscal year 2014 for I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)-(8) 
organizations is almost entirely attributable to a dramatic increase in the number of reported I.R.C. 
§ 501(c)(4) organizations.  Compare IRS DATA BOOK 2013, at 56 (91,056 such organizations), with IRS 
DATA BOOK 2014, at 58 (148,585 such organizations).  In response to an inquiry, the IRS stated its 
preliminary conclusion is that this increase represents “entities that have applied for an [Employer 
Identification Number] as an exempt organization (EO) but have not yet filed a Form 1023 or 1024 and 
obtained an EO determination” (and so are not necessarily claiming exemption under I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)).  E-
mail from Emily Gross, IRS Statistics of Income Division (Aug. 31, 2015, 3:22 p.m. EDT) (on file with 
author). 
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Table 2: Exempt Organizations: Finances12 (millions of dollars) 
Fiscal 







1995 1,143,079 159,344 663,371 81,415 
2000 1,562,536 217,068 866,208 109,350 
2005 2,241,887 282,862 1,252,889 153,688 
2010 2,946,521 342,898 1,593,011 176,623 
2011 3,030,133 359,926 1,647,905 179,300 
 
The numbers reproduced in the first table above appear to exclude I.R.C. § 501(c) 
organizations that are not required to apply for IRS recognition of their exempt status and 
have not chosen to voluntarily do so.13   Organizations not required to apply include 
churches, certain church-related entities, very small organizations (less than $5,000 in 
annual gross receipts), and all non-501(c)(3) entities.14  A study by the Urban Institute 
estimates that churches currently number approximately 300,000 and very small 
organizations number approximately 400,000.15  These figures also do not include several 
other, relatively small in terms of numbers and financial resources, types of exempt 
organizations that fell within the jurisdiction of the IRS Exempt Organizations Division 
during some or all of this period, nor do they include a small subset of taxable entities 
(primarily non-exempt trusts) that also fell within that division’s jurisdiction during this 
period.16 
Similarly, the financial figures do not include organizations that are not required 
to file annual information returns, including churches, certain church-related entities, and 
organizations with annual gross receipts below certain thresholds (which thresholds have 
varied over time).17  The financial figures for I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organizations also do not 
include financial information for private foundations, which the IRS reports separately.  
Those figures also reflect a growth in numbers and financial resources over the same time 
                                                      
12 Cecelia Hilgert & Melissa Whitten, Charities and Other Tax-Exempt Organizations, 1995, STAT. 
INC. BULL. 105, 123-25 (Winter 1998-1999); Paul Arnsberger, Charities and Other Tax-Exempt 
Organizations, 2000, STAT. INC. BULL. 122, 134-36 (Fall 2003); Paul Arnsberger, Charities, Labor and 
Agricultural, and Other Tax-Exempt Organizations, 2005, STAT. INC. BULL. 271, 281-82 (Fall 2008); Paul 
Arnsberger, Nonprofit Charitable Organizations, 2010, STAT. INC. BULL. 74, 85, 87 (Winter 2014); Paul 
Arnsberger, Nonprofit Charitable Organizations, 2011, STAT. INC. BULL. 1, 10, 12 (Spring 2015) [hereinafter 
Charitable Organizations 2011].  These sources rely on a sample of annual information returns for each 
fiscal year.  See, e.g., Charitable Organizations 2011, at 4. 
13 See IRS DATA BOOK 2014, at 58 n.1. 
14 See I.R.C. § 6033(c)(1) (2014). 
15 See KATIE L. ROEGER ET AL., THE NONPROFIT ALMANAC 2012, at 2 n.1 (2012). 
16 For example, as of fiscal year 2014 there were 222 I.R.C. § 501(d) religious and apostolic 
associations, 29,462 I.R.C. § 527 political organizations, and 125,177 non-exempt trusts also within the 
division’s jurisdiction.  IRS DATA BOOK 2014, at 56-58. 
17 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-05-561T, TAX-EXEMPT SECTOR: GOVERNANCE, 
TRANSPARENCY, AND OVERSIGHT ARE CRITICAL TO MAINTAINING PUBLIC TRUST 7 (2005) [hereinafter GAO 
2005 REPORT]. 
86 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW [Vol.7:80 
period, although revenues and to a lesser extent assets have varied more.18  In 2012, the 
latest year reported by the IRS, private foundations had assets worth approximately $633 
billion and total annual revenue of approximately $95 billion.19 
The growth in the number and financial resources of exempt organizations follows 
a trend that dates back to at least 1975 and likely earlier.20  The decline in the number of 
organizations (but not the reported financial resources) after fiscal year 2010 is primarily 
the result of Congress automatically revoking the exempt status of organizations that failed 
to file three consecutive required annual information returns after 2006.21  While some of 
those organizations were active, most of them likely had ceased operations and so did not 
represent a significant amount of activities, assets, or revenues.22 
As for IRS resources dedicated to overseeing exempt organizations, the IRS does 
not release separate budget figures for its Exempt Organizations Division.23  In recent 
years, however, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has provided information 
about the number of employees within this division.  
                                                      
18 See Cynthia Belmonte, Domestic Private Foundations and Related Excise Taxes, Tax Year 2009, 
STAT. INC. BULL. 114, 115 (Winter 2013); Melissa Ludlum, Domestic Private Foundations, Tax Years 1993-
2002, STAT. INC. BULL. 162, 163 (Fall 2005). 
19 IRS, SOI TAX STATS – DOMESTIC PRIVATE FOUNDATION AND CHARITABLE TRUST STATISTICS, 
http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Domestic-Private-Foundation-and-Charitable-Trust-Statistics [http:// 
perma.cc/MC8F-YQDG] (see Statistical Tables, Domestic Private Foundations: Number and Selected 
Financial Data, Tax Year 2012, cells X11 & D11). 
20 See Alicia Meckstroth & Paul Arnsberger, A 20-Year Review of the Nonprofit Sector, 1975-1995, 
STAT. INC. BULL. 149, 151, 153 (Fall 1998). 
21 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-164, TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: BETTER 
COMPLIANCE INDICATORS AND DATA, AND MORE COLLABORATION WITH STATE REGULATORS WOULD 
STRENGTHEN OVERSIGHT OF CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS 11 (2014) [hereinafter GAO 2014 EO REP.]. 
22 See Amy S. Blackwood & Katie L. Roeger, Revoked: A Snapshot of Organizations That Lost 
Their Tax-Exempt Status, URBAN INSTITUTE, at 2 (Aug. 2011), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files 
/alfresco/publication-pdfs/412386-Revoked-A-Snapshot-of-Organizations-that-Lost-their-Tax-Exempt-Status 
.pdf [http://perma.cc/C5S4-KC72]; Linda M. Lampkin, Automatic Revocation of Nonprofits’ Tax-Exempt 
Status: What Nonprofits, Grantmakers, and Donors Need to Know 3 (July 27, 2010), https://www.guidestar 
.org/ViewCmsFile.aspx?ContentID=2947 [https://perma.cc/Q9N6-8JYX]. 
23 The Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation has on occasion obtained these figures, however.  
See, e.g., STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCS-3-00, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS 
RELATING TO INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE HANDLING OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATION MATTERS 120 (2000) 
[hereinafter JCT 2000 REPORT]. 
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Table 3: IRS Exempt Organizations Division Employees24 (full-time equivalents) 
Fiscal 




Outreach & Other 
2000 798 424 342 32 
2005 856 467 347 42 
2010 889 529 341 19 
2011 886 534 328 24 
2012 858 516 319 23 
2013 842 493 326 23 
 
Looking further into the past, for fiscal year 1975 the IRS reported devoting an 
average of 495 field professional positions to the examination of exempt organization 
returns.26  While this earlier figure is not directly comparable to the figures from recent 
years, it suggests that the number of employees dedicated to examinations in fiscal year 
2013 is about the same as almost 40 years earlier.27  For fiscal year 1975 the IRS reported 
658 average positions, with 666 employees at the end of the year, indicating that the 
Exempt Organization Division in fiscal year 2013 had about 20 percent more employees 
total than 38 years earlier.28  The reliability of this figure is unclear, however, as a 1977 
report stated that “[a]bout 1,000 IRS employees administer the exempt organization 
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code,” or about 160 more employees than do so today.29  
Regardless of the exact figures, however, during approximately the same time period the 
number of organizations exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c) has almost doubled and the financial 
resources controlled by the most common organizations has increased by 50 percent or 
more over just the fourteen years from 1995 to 2011 (adjusting for inflation).30  And both 
the applicable law and the main forms filed by exempt organizations have increased in 
complexity and length, as detailed later in this Part.31 
The IRS employees dedicated to exempt organization matters do not operate in a 
vacuum.  Rather, they enjoy significant support from other parts of the IRS and the federal 
government.  These other parts include: service center, technology, other support, and 
appeals staff within the IRS; Chief Counsel staff and other Treasury employees who help 
                                                      
24 GAO 2014 EO REP., supra note 21, at 20; GAO 2005 REPORT, supra note 17, at 41; see also JCT 
2000 REPORT, supra note 23, at 60 (862 and 946 total EO staff in fiscal years 1990 and 1995, respectively). 
25 The figures for 2000 and 2005 are for “Determinations” while the figures for later years are for 
“Rulings & Agreements,” a broader function that included determinations. 
26 COMM’R OF INTERNAL REVENUE, ANN. REP. 1975, at 41. 
27 See also U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFF., GAO-02-526, TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: 
IMPROVEMENTS POSSIBLE IN PUBLIC, IRS, AND STATE OVERSIGHT OF CHARITIES 23 (2002) [hereinafter GAO 
2002 REPORT] (IRS Tax Exempt and Government Entities staffing remained essentially flat from 1974 to 
1997). 
28 See COMM’R OF INTERNAL REVENUE, supra note 26, at 147. 
29 David Ginsburg et al., Federal Oversight of Private Philanthropy, in 5 COMMISSION ON PRIVATE 
PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS, RESEARCH PAPERS 2578, 2581 (1977). 
30 See Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI Inflation Calculator, http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation 
_calculator.htm [http://perma.cc/R9WB-ASNC] (used to adjust 1995 figures to 2011 dollars); supra notes 10, 
12 and accompanying text. 
31 See infra notes 48-50, 60-62 and accompanying text. 
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with exempt organizations matters; and attorneys within the Department of Justice’s Tax 
Division who litigate certain disputes with exempt organizations.32  Information regarding 
how the availability of these other supports has varied over time is not readily available, 
however. 
B. Applications for Recognition of Exemption 
For fiscal year 1970, the IRS reported receiving 23,349 applications and issuing 
17,367 determination letters, representing a steady increase in both applications and 
determination letters from the comparable figures four years earlier (17,361 and 14,394, 
respectively). 33   For fiscal year 1980 the IRS reported having processed 49,534 
applications, with 36,980 approved, 1,914 denied, and 10,640 withdrawn or otherwise 
disposed of without a determination. 34   The following table shows more detailed 
information that the IRS has made available in recent years regarding the applications that 
it closed. 
 
Table 4: Applications Closed35 
Fiscal 
Year 
Charitable (501(c)(3)) Other 501(c) 
Total Approved Denied Other Total Approved Denied Other 
1995 56,408 42,324 377 13,707 10,866 8,289 242 2,355 
2000 74,534 61,005 456 13,073 8,120 6,229 26 1,865 
2005 77,539 63,402 765 13,372 6,029 4,801 16 1,212 
2010 59,945 48,934 500 10,511 5,600 4,726 13 628 
2011 55,319 49,677 205 5,437 5,656 5,016 10 609 
2012 51,748 45,029 123 6,596 9,027 7,547 20 1,127 
2013 45,289 37,946 79 7,264 7,750 6,162 9 1,116 
2014 100,032 94,365 67 5,600 17,493 16,289 22 1,182 
 
Other resolutions include applications withdrawn by the organization, applications 
that did not provide required information or were otherwise incomplete, or applications on 
                                                      
32 See IRS, TODAY’S IRS ORGANIZATION, http://www.irs.gov/uac/Today’s-IRS-Organization [http:// 
perma.cc/4VMW-PG5M]; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, TAX POLICY, http://www.treasury.gov/about 
/organizational-structure/offices/Pages/Tax-Policy.aspx [http://perma.cc/7KD4-3VNM]; U.S. DEPARTMENT 
OF JUSTICE, TAX DIVISION, http://www.justice.gov/tax [http://perma.cc/X699-HN6V]. 
33 COMM’R OF INTERNAL REVENUE, 1970 ANN. REP. 26. 
34 IRS 1980 ANNUAL REPORT 76. 
35 See IRS DATA BOOK 1995, at 25; IRS DATA BOOK 2000, at 23; IRS DATA BOOK 2005, at 39; IRS 
DATA BOOK 2010, at 55; IRS DATA BOOK 2011, at 55; IRS DATA BOOK 2012, at 55; IRS DATA BOOK 2013, at 
55; IRS DATA BOOK 2014, at 57. 
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which the IRS refused to rule.36  Data from the 1990s indicates that during the decade more 
than two-thirds of other resolutions were for failure to establish exemption.37 
The IRS does not generally release the number of applications it receives each 
fiscal year.  In 2012 congressional testimony, however, a senior IRS official reported that 
the IRS receives approximately 60,000 applications annually, of which more than 50,000 
are for exemption under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).38  This latter figure is similar to an Urban 
Institute estimate of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) applications for the period from 2001 through 2011 
of between approximately 45,000 to slightly over 50,000 per year.39  The reason why the 
number of closed I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) applications is so much higher than that figure in 2000 
and 2005 is apparently because before 2009 the IRS included in the closed applications 
figure private foundation status rulings that many applicants routinely received five years 
after their initial application; these closed “foundation follow-up cases” averaged over 
19,000 annually from 2001 to 2008.40  Closed cases also reflect some other types of 
determinations, but based on the apparent number of applications those other 
determinations are probably relatively rare.41 
In recent years, however, the IRS has seen a sharp increase in applications due to 
organizations seeking reinstatement after automatic revocations began in 2011.42  When 
the Department of the Treasury submitted the new Form 1023-EZ and revised Form 1023 
to the Office of Management and Budget for review in 2014, it stated that annually there 
are approximately 80,000 applications for recognition under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) alone, 
which presumably included requests for reinstatement.43 
Therefore, the decline in the number of applications processed from 2010 to 2013 
reflects not a reduction in the number of applications submitted but rather an increased 
backlog of pending applications, including requests for reinstatement.44  This backlog 
reached more than 60,000, which at the then current processing pace would have taken the 
IRS more than a year to clear.45  Using the streamlined procedures and application form 
                                                      
36 See, e.g., IRS DATA BOOK 2014, at 57 n.2. 
37 See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION OF PRESENT LAW RELATING TO 
CHARITABLE AND OTHER EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS AND STATISTICAL INFORMATION REGARDING GROWTH AND 
OVERSIGHT OF THE TAX-EXEMPT SECTOR 41 (2004). 
38 Public Charity Organizational Issues, Unrelated Business Income Tax, and the Revised Form 
990: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 112th Cong. 5, 8 
(2012) [hereinafter 2012 Hearings] (statement of Steven T. Miller, Deputy Commissioner of Services and 
Enforcement, Internal Revenue Service). 
39 Amy S. Blackwood & Katie L. Roeger, Applications for 501(c)(3) Tax-Exempt Status Declining: 
Recession or Rule Change?, URBAN INSTITUTE, at 2 (2013), http://www.urban.org/research/publication 
/applications-501c3-tax-exempt-status-declining-recession-or-rule-change [http://perma.cc/2PTH-LDQJ]. 
40 Id. at 1-2. 
41 See, e.g., IRS DATA BOOK 2014, at 57 n.1. 
42 See Eric B. Carriker et al., Exempt Organizations: Leveraging Limited IRS Resources in the Tax 
Administration of Small Tax-Exempt Organizations, in ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON TAX EXEMPT AND GOV’T 
ENTITIES, 2013 REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS 10; 1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., 2012 ANN. REP. TO 
CONGRESS 194, 196. 
43 See Submission for OMB Review: Comment Request, 79 Fed. Reg. 18124, 18125 (Mar. 31, 
2014). 
44 See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND THE 
RIGHTS OF APPLICANTS FOR TAX-EXEMPT STATUS 27 (2013); supra note 42. 
45 See Press Release, IRS, New 1023-EZ Form Makes Applying for 501(c)(3) Tax-Exempt Status 
Easier; Most Charities Qualify (July 1, 2014), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/New-1023-EZ-Form-
Makes-Applying-for-501c3Tax-Exempt-Status-Easier-Most-Charities-Qualify [http://perma.cc/RB29-
Q8GV]. 
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described in Part III.C.1 below, in fiscal year 2014 the IRS more than doubled the number 
of applications closed.46  At the same time, however, the proportion of applications denied 
or resolved by means other than approval or denial dropped significantly (from 0.17% to 
0.08% and from 15.8% to 5.8%, respectively).47 
Over time, the application forms have become lengthier and more complex.  For 
example, the Form 1023 for organizations seeking recognition of exemption under I.R.C. 
§ 501(c)(3) has grown from four pages when it was first introduced in the early 1950s to 
twelve pages, plus fourteen pages of schedules that apply to certain types of 
organizations.48  The counterpart form for organizations seeking recognition of exemption 
under other provisions of I.R.C. § 501(c) has grown from two pages in the early 1960s to 
six pages, plus thirteen pages of schedules that apply to certain types of organizations.49  
At least part of this growth is attributable to the increasing complexity of the statutes and 
other federal tax rules governing exemption.50 
C. Annual Information Returns and Examinations 
As noted above, Congress did not generally require exempt organizations to file 
annual information returns until 1944.51  Even then, there were apparently no examinations 
of such returns before 1954 unless the IRS received a complaint.52  The IRS examined the 
returns of 13,000 exempt organizations in 1966 but only the returns of 8,500 organizations 
in 1970. 53  This decline was part of the impetus for IRS to create the Exempt Organization 
Examination Branch in 1970 and to implement other structural changes to increase its 
capacity for overseeing exempt organizations.  Examinations appear to have peaked in 
fiscal year 1973, when the IRS examined the returns of almost 19,000 organizations; close 
to 15,000 of these organizations were private foundations, as required to fulfill a 
commitment by the then IRS Commissioner to examine all private foundations within five 
years of the new rules imposed on them by Congress in 1969.54  The following table shows 
the examination information reported by the IRS for more recent years.  
                                                      
46 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
47 See id. 
48 Karen A. Gries et al., Exempt Organizations: Form 1023 – Updating It for the Future, in 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON TAX EXEMPT AND GOV’T ENTITIES, REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS 6 (2012); see 
also IRS Form 1023 (revised Dec. 2013). 
49 See IRS Form 1024 (revised Sept. 1998); IRS Form 1024 (revised June 1962), http://texashistory 
.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth250819/m1/1/ [http://perma.cc/E8TH-MGAR]. 
50 See Nicole S. Dandridge, Choking Out Local Community Service Organizations: Rising Federal 
Tax Regulation and Its Impact on Small Nonprofit Entities, 99 KY. L.J. 695, 708 (2011). 
51 Supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
52 Ginsburg et al., supra note 29, at 2584. 
53 Id. at 2584-85; see also COMM’R OF INTERNAL REVENUE 1970 ANN. REP. 24-26. 
54 Id. at 2610. 
2016] “THE BETTER PART OF VALOUR IS DISCRETION” 91 


















1995 523,191 3,852 380 0.8% 6,265 
2000 719,928 3,630 200 0.5% 3,605 
2005 849,342 2,402 362 0.3% 2,189 
2010 776,300 3,596 329 0.5% 7,524 
2011 858,865 2,962 240 0.4% 8,849 
2012 798,903 2,918 125 0.4% 7,700 
2013 771,675 2,774 138 0.4% 7,693 
2014 765,395 2,579 246 0.4% 5,259 
 
Annual returns include Form 990, Form 990-EZ, Form 990-PF (for private 
foundations), Form 1041-A (relating to certain trusts), Form 1120-POL (relating to certain 
political organizations), and Form 5227 (also relating to certain trusts).56  In contrast, other 
returns are returns that exempt organizations normally file in addition to its annual 
information return, such as Form 990-T (unrelated business income tax).57 
The number of annual returns examined does not necessarily equal the number of 
organizations that had their annual returns examined, as the IRS might choose to examine 
returns from multiple years for a single organization. 58   Also, while the percentage 
provided is based on the number of annual returns examined in a given fiscal year 
compared to the number of annual returns filed during the calendar year ending in that 
fiscal year, it only provides a rough estimate of examination coverage because the returns 
examined in a given fiscal year were usually filed in earlier years.59 
As with the application form, the annual information returns have also generally 
grown longer and more complex over time, where the number of pages acts as a rough 
measure of their length and complexity.  Occurring in 2007, the most recent major revision 
of the Form 990 resulted in a form with eleven pages that all filers must complete and 
sixteen schedules that certain organizations may also need to complete (and since then the 
                                                      
55 See IRS DATA BOOK 1995, at 14, 33; IRS DATA BOOK 2000, at 20; IRS DATA BOOK 2005, at 32-
33; IRS DATA BOOK 2010, at 33; IRS DATA BOOK 2011, at 33; IRS DATA BOOK 2012, at 33; IRS DATA BOOK 
2013, at 33; IRS DATA BOOK 2014, at 34. 
56 See, e.g., IRS DATA BOOK 2014, at 34 n.1. 
57 See, e.g., id. at 34. 
58 See GAO 2002 REPORT, supra note 27, at 22; Marcus S. Owens, Charity Oversight: An 
Alternative Approach 2 n.2 (2013), http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/download/fedora_content 
/download/ac:168629/CONTENT/Owens_-_Charity_Oversight_An_Alternative_Approach.pdf [http://perma 
.cc/6R9M-ZE2X]. 
59 Owens, supra note 58, at 2 n.2. 
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main form has grown to twelve pages).60  By comparison, the form was only a single page 
long in 1968, and before the 2007 revision, it was only nine pages long with two possible 
schedules (including a seven-page schedule applicable to most I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) 
organizations).61  A significant part of the most recent growth in the length of the form 
appears to have been driven by the IRS’s addition of numerous inquiries relating to 
governance issues.62 
There are several important additional caveats to this return and examination 
information.  First, churches (of all faiths) and certain church-related entities are exempt 
from the annual return requirements.63  While the IRS can still examine a church, the 
existence of special statutory protections for churches and, in recent years, questions about 
the proper implementation of those protections have made examinations of churches very 
rare.64  Second, there are financial filing thresholds for the Form 990 and, after it was 
introduced in 1989, the Form 990-EZ.65  The threshold for most exempt organizations 
having to file the Form 990-EZ is having annual gross receipts of more than $50,000.66  
While the financial filing thresholds have varied over time, their existence means that many 
smaller exempt organizations had not been required to file annual information returns 
before Congress imposed that requirement on all exempt organizations (except churches 
and certain church-related entities) in 2006.67  For these smaller organizations, the IRS now 
requires the online Form 990-N, which only asks for eight items of information.68  In fiscal 
year 2014, the IRS received 470,895 of these Forms 990-N.69  The IRS does not appear to 
release any information regarding the number of examinations involving the Form 990-N, 
but it has procedures in place for such examinations and has recently stated that it instituted 
                                                      
60 See IRS, Overview of Form 990 Redesign for Tax Year 2008 (2007), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
tege/overview__form__990__redesign.pdf [http://perma.cc/9HKV-UBMA]; IRS, Form 990 (2014), https:// 
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990.pdf [https://perma.cc/GHD2-HJLM]. 
61 See IRS Form 990 (1968), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/f990shf--1968.pdf [http://perma.cc 
/KU5W-8FAL] (for exempt organizations other than those exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)); IRS, Form 990-
A (1968), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/f990asf--1968.pdf [http://perma.cc/CST5-5U9R] (for 
organizations exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)); IRS, Form 990 (2007), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior 
/f990--2007.pdf [http://perma.cc/22W5-ESHL]; IRS, 2007, Instructions for Form 990 and Form 990-EZ, at 5 
(2007), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/i990-ez--2007.pdf [http://perma.cc/2EEF-9GGA]; IRS, Schedule A, 
Form 990 (2007), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/f990sa--2007.pdf [http://perma.cc/V48K-H2XX]. 
62 See Rummana Alam, Note, Not What the Doctors Ordered: Nonprofit Hospitals and the New 
Corporate Governance Requirements of the Form 990, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 229, 240. 
63 Supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
64 See I.R.C. § 7611 (2014); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7611-1, 74 Fed. Reg. 39003 (Aug 5, 2009); 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-514, IRS EXAMINATION SELECTION: INTERNAL CONTROLS FOR 
EXEMPT ORGANIZATION SELECTION SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED 25-26 (2015) [hereinafter GAO 2015 REP.]. 
65 See Service Considering Improvements to Collection of UBIT Information, 42 TAX NOTES 1053 
(1989). 
66 IRS, 2014 Instructions for Form 990-EZ, at 4 (2014), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i990ez.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EX7H-VG3W]. 
67 See Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280 § 1223, 120 Stat. 780, 1090 (2006) 
(codified at I.R.C. § 6033(i)); IRS, ANNUAL ELECTRONIC FILING REQUIREMENT FOR SMALL EXEMPT 
ORGANIZATIONS – FORM 990-N (E-POSTCARD), http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Annual-
Electronic-Filing-Requirement-for-Small-Exempt-Organizations-Form-990-N-%28e-Postcard%29 [http:// 
perma.cc/BW6D-VTVK] [hereinafter IRS FORM 990-N WEBSITE] (last updated April 21, 2015). 
68 IRS FORM 990-N WEBSITE, supra note 67. 
69 IRS DATA BOOK, 2014, at 34 n.1. 
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compliance checks on hundreds of organizations that had filed the form since they appeared 
to be ineligible to do so.70 
D. Guidance, Rulings, Technical Advice and Other Activities 
The IRS also provides precedential guidance in a variety of forms, responds to 
taxpayers’ formal requests for rulings, issues technical advice in response to requests made 
either by IRS employees or by organizations during the course of examinations, and 
responds to other correspondence both from the public and from members of Congress. 
 









2000 10 26 2,182 595 
2005 7 22 1,664 501 
2010 7 33 400 525 
2011 18 27 390 607 
2012 15 37 357 702 
2013 8 24 566 810 
2014 16 33 724 735 
 
Guidance is defined as regulations, revenue rulings, revenue procedures, notices, 
announcements, and information/news releases.72  Annual IRS reports from earlier years 
show a significantly higher number of regulations, revenue rulings, and revenue procedures 
issued through the early 1980s, peaking at 84 in fiscal year 1977 (the annual reports did 
not consistently provide figures for other types of guidance).73  The sharp decline in such 
guidance, particularly revenue rulings and procedures, coincided with the controversy that 
erupted over the IRS’s handling of private schools with racial discriminatory policies, 
which culminated in the Bob Jones University Supreme Court case.74  One critical part of 
the controversy was a revenue procedure that Congress so disfavored that it passed 
legislation preventing the IRS from spending any funds to enforce it.  This may have led 
the Treasury and the IRS to shy away from issuing guidance more generally with respect 
                                                      
70 See id. at 34; IRM 4.75.15.6(2), http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-075-015.html [http://perma 
.cc/9MNW-EQ3H]; IRS EXEMPT ORG., FY 2012 ANN. REP. & FY 2013 WORKPLAN 20 (2012), http://www.irs 
.gov/pub/irs-tege/FY2012_EO_AnnualRpt_2013_Work_Plan.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZA7R-ASTK] [hereinafter 
EO 2012 ANN. REP.]. 
71 See IRS DATA BOOK, 2000, at 22; IRS DATA BOOK, 2005, at 37; IRS DATA BOOK, 2010, at 53; 
IRS DATA BOOK, 2011, at 53; IRS DATA BOOK, 2012, at 53; IRS DATA BOOK, 2013, at 53; IRS DATA BOOK, 
2014, at 55. 
72 See, e.g., IRS DATA BOOK, 2014, at 55 n.1. 
73 See 1975 IRS. ANN. REP. 45; 1976 IRS ANN. REP. 45; 1977 IRS ANN. REP. 37; 1978 IRS ANN. 
REP. 33; 1979 IRS ANN. REP. 25; 1980 IRS ANN. REP. 33; 1981 IRS ANN. REP. 20; 1982 IRS ANN. REP. 17; 
1983 IRS ANN. REP. 17; 1984 IRS ANN. REP. 20. 
74 See Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
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to exempt organizations.75  Beginning at that time, there was also a general decline in 
revenue rulings, possibly driven by an increasing IRS priority on resolving open cases more 
swiftly.76 
Technical advice and assistance refers to written responses to internal requests for 
legal guidance from IRS employers.77  Such technical advice and assistance similarly 
peaked in the mid-1980s at slightly over 400 annually, and closed ruling requests from 
taxpayers peaked at close to 6,000 at the same time.78  The reason for the sharp decline in 
later years is not clear, although again there was a general decline in such guidance that 
began in the 1980s, possibly driven by the increasing IRS priority on resolving open cases 
more swiftly and without having to issue publicly available (even in redacted form) 
documents.79  The IRS had also begun to take steps that discouraged requests for private 
letter rulings, including imposing (and then significantly increasing) a fee for such rulings, 
making more areas off limits for such rulings, and adopting streamlined procedures for 
some common rulings. 80   The fact that the amount of both precedential and non-
precedential guidance declined generally over the past several decades makes it unlikely 
that the recent shift in responsibility for guidance relating to exempt organizations from the 
IRS to the Office of Chief Counsel will cause a resurgence.81 
Finally, the IRS also engages in public education in a variety of ways, including 
maintaining an extensive website of exempt organization information, drafting and 
revising publications as needed, hosting various workshops for the public and practitioners, 
and communicating with the regulated community in numerous ways.82  However, the 
Service has discontinued some forms of public education in recent years, most notably the 
internal but publicly available articles published as part of the Exempt Organizations 
Continuing Professional Education Technical Instruction Program.83 
E. Current Compliance 
Despite these trends, it is not clear to what extent this reduced IRS oversight has 
led to increased violations of the applicable federal tax laws by exempt organizations.  
Information regarding such violations, and related violations of applicable state and local 
                                                      
75 See Olatunde C. Johnson, The Story of Bob Jones University v. United States: Race, Religion, 
and Congress’ Extraordinary Acquiescence, in STATUTORY INTERPRETATION STORIES 126, 137-38 (William 
Eskridge & Elizabeth Garrett eds., 2010). 
76 See Marion Marshall et al., The Changing Landscape of IRS Guidance: A Downward Slope, 90 
TAX NOTES 673, 673 (2001). 
77 IRM 7.1.2.3.1, 7.1.2.3.2, http://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07-001-002.html [http://perma.cc 
/25V6-YSPL]. 
78 See 1982 IRS ANN. REP. 59; 1983 IRS ANN. REP. 63; 1984 IRS ANN. REP. 63; IRS, HIGHLIGHTS 
OF 1985, at 7; 1986 IRS ANN. REP. 59; 1987 IRS ANN. REP. 58; 1988 IRS ANN. REP. 56. 
79 See Marshall et al., supra note 76, at 673-74. 
80 See id. at 674; Rev. Proc. 2015-1, 2015-1 I.R.B. 1, 80 (setting user fees); IRS, Form 8940 
Miscellaneous Determination Requests, https://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/New-Form-8940-for-
Miscellaneous-Determination-Requests [https://perma.cc/SVG5-EJJJ] (last updated Aug. 28, 2015). 
81 IRS Announcement 2014-34, 2014-51 I.R.B. 949; see also Matthew R. Madara, Realignment of 
EO Rulings Will Bring New Work Rules, 146 TAX NOTES 1215 (2015). 
82 See IRS TAX INFORMATION FOR CHARITIES AND OTHER NON-PROFITS, http://www.irs.gov 
/Charities-&-Non-Profits [http://perma.cc/M3RF-WN3T] (last updated Oct. 16, 2015); Carriker, supra note 
42, at 9-10. 
83 See IRS, EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS-CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION ARTICLES, http://www 
.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Exempt-Organizations-Continuing-Professional-Education-Technical-
Instruction-Program [http://perma.cc/VGC3-XN8N] (last updated May 1, 2015); Kim Barker & Justin Elliott, 
How The IRS’s Nonprofit Division Got So Dysfunctional, PROPUBLICA (May 17, 2013). 
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laws, is almost completely anecdotal. 84   The IRS estimated a voluntary payment 
compliance rate for all tax-exempt and government entities in tax year 2001 of 99.87%, the 
highest rate among the four IRS operating divisions.85  It is not clear how reliable or how 
reflective of actual compliance that figure is, given that violations of the requirements for 
exemption rarely result in revocation. 86   At the same time, some instances of 
noncompliance may not be related to the federal tax law requirements for exemption, such 
as failures to comply with employment tax rules.87 
The IRS has attempted to gather more data specifically about compliance with the 
requirements for exemption within certain subsets of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organizations 
through various projects.  Most of those projects have found a relatively limited and minor 
incidence of noncompliance.  For example, the Colleges and Universities Compliance 
Project resulted in less than 10 percent of colleges and universities surveyed being selected 
for examination, with examinations uncovering various unrelated business income tax, 
compensation-setting procedure, and employment tax issues, but no issues that apparently 
rose to the level that would justify revocation of exempt status.88  Similarly, the Hospital 
Compliance Project did not report any significant compliance issues based on 
questionnaires received from almost 500 hospitals and led to compensation-focused 
examinations of only 20 of those hospitals.89  While the Political Activities Compliance 
Initiative led to examinations of over 250 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organizations for alleged 
prohibited political activity, which was substantiated in over half the examinations, the IRS 
apparently found most violations minor or inadvertent enough that it resolved almost all 
with only a warning.90  The one notable exception is the Credit Counseling Compliance 
Project, which resulted in revocation of exempt status, completed or proposed, for all 41 
completed examinations.91  But even before this project, credit-counseling organizations 
only represented a tiny proportion of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organizations.92 
There are nevertheless some indications that at least minor noncompliance may be 
relatively widespread in the larger exempt organizations universe.  For example, a recent 
project focusing on large private foundations resulted in additional taxes or penalties in 
                                                      
84 See, e.g., Roger Colinvaux, Charity in the 21st Century: Trending Toward Decay, 11 FLA. TAX 
REV. 1, 19-20 (2011); Marion Fremont-Smith & Andras Kosaras, Wrongdoing by Officers and Directors of 
Charities: A Survey of Press Reports 1995-2002, 42 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 25 (2003); Mark Sidel, The 
Guardians Guarding Themselves: A Comparative Perspective on Nonprofit Self-Regulation, 80 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 803, 804-07 (2005). 
85 IRS, REDUCING THE FEDERAL TAX GAP: A REPORT ON IMPROVING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE 16 
(2007). 
86 See Evelyn Brody, Sunshine and Shadows on Charity Governance: Public Disclosure as a 
Regulatory Tool, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 183, 219 & n.139 (2012). 
87 See Memorandum from J. Russell George to Jacob Lew, supra note 4, at 7-8. 
88 IRS COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES COMPLIANCE PROJECT FINAL REP. 2-6 (2013), http://www.irs 
.gov/pub/irs-tege/CUCP_FinalRpt_042513.pdf [http://perma.cc/6SK7-Q3WQ] [hereinafter UNIVERSITIES 
REP.]. 
89 IRS EXEMPT ORG., HOSPITAL COMPLIANCE PROJECT FINAL REP. 1-5 (2014), http://www.irs.gov 
/pub/irs-tege/frepthospproj.pdf [http://perma.cc/2QZH-6AMS] [hereinafter HOSPITAL REP.]. 
90 IRS EXEMPT ORG., 2011 WORK PLAN 19-21 (2011), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/fy2011_eo 
_workplan.pdf [http://perma.cc/4V3A-TQ8B].  The limited information available on a related sub-project 
involving political contributions also indicates the IRS resolved almost all confirmed violations with a written 
warning.  See IRS, 2006 POLITICAL ACTIVITIES COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE 6-7 (2007), http://www.irs.gov/pub 
/irs-tege/2006paci_report_5-30-07.pdf [http://perma.cc/2R3D-BTAS]. 
91 IRS, CREDIT COUNSELING COMPLIANCE PROJECT 3 (2006), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/cc 
_report.pdf [http://perma.cc/CZF4-UPZY]. 
92 Id. at 1. 
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almost half of the closed examinations, although apparently no revocations as of the last 
report from the IRS.93  And an IRS review of several thousand organizations in the middle 
of the last decade resulted in 22 percent being referred for examination, including 15 
percent of recently established organizations.94  Scholars also have identified significant 
accuracy problems with the annual information returns (the Form 990 series) filed by 
exempt organizations.95  However, many of the inaccuracies appear to stem from arithmetic 
and other inadvertent errors or from efforts to present the organization in a better light to 
donors and other potential supporters, rather than representing efforts to hide violations of 
the federal tax laws.96 
This limited information has left scholars and other commentators to extrapolate 
(i.e., guess) the extent to which known violations are reflected in the wider exempt 
organization sector and, for obvious reasons, these extrapolations vary widely.97  It appears, 
however, that the vast majority of exempt organizations seek to comply with the applicable 
federal tax laws, with only a small subset of organizations and their leaders being engaged 
in intentional and significant violations (as apparently frequently occurred in the credit 
counseling area).  But even inadvertent violations are still a concern, especially since 
exempt organizations, particularly charities, risk a significant loss in public confidence and 
support from even a relatively low level of noncompliance.98  The challenge for the IRS is 
therefore to help the apparently vast majority of exempt organizations that desire to comply 
with the applicable tax laws to do so, while at the same time identifying and addressing the 
relatively small pockets of intentional and significant noncompliance, even as the Service’s 
resources fail to keep pace with the size and complexity of both the exempt organizations 
community and the applicable law. 
III. MODIFYING OVERSIGHT 
This Part first briefly reviews the concerns raised by commentators regarding IRS 
oversight of exempt organizations and related proposals for improving that oversight.  It 
then considers whether there are currently promising candidates for improving oversight 
in light of the resource constraints the IRS faces, drawing on the extensive literature 
addressing tax law compliance more generally.  This consideration includes describing the 
                                                      
93 EO 2012 ANN. REP., supra note 70, at 19. 
94 TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMIN., PERFORMANCE MEASURES AND IMPROVED CASE 
TRACKING WOULD HELP THE EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS FUNCTION BETTER ALLOCATE RESOURCES 4 (2008) 
[hereinafter TIGTA 2008 REP.]. 
95 See Carolyn Cordery, Light-Handed Charity Regulation: Its Effect on Reporting Practice in New 
Zealand 6-7 (Working Paper No. 83, 2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2028666 
[http://perma.cc/58EP-MQZ7] (summarizing this research). 
96 See GAO 2002 REPORT, supra note 27, at 9-13; Elizabeth K. Keating & Peter Frumkin, 
Reengineering Nonprofit Financial Accountability: Toward a More Reliable Foundation for Regulation, 63 
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 7 (2003); see also Jeffrey J. Burks, Accounting Errors in Nonprofit Organizations, 29 
ACCOUNTING HORIZONS 341, 350, 360-61 (2015) (finding a relatively high rate of accounting errors among 
public charities as compared to U.S. publicly traded companies but no evidence of intentional manipulations, 
and also finding indications that financial audits of public charities are relatively rigorous and independent). 
97 See, e.g., Colinvaux, supra note 84, at 19-20; Fremont-Smith & Kosaras, supra note 84, at 25; 
Terri Lynn Helge, Policing the Good Guys: Regulation of the Charitable Sector Through a Federal Charity 
Oversight Board, 19 CORNELL J. LAW & PUB. POL’Y 1, 3-5 (2009); Peter Swords, The Form 990 As An 
Accountability Tool For 501(c)(3) Nonprofits, 51 TAX LAW. 571, 573-74 (1998). 
98 See PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, STRENGTHENING TRANSPARENCY, GOVERNANCE, 
ACCOUNTABILITY OF CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS: A FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS AND THE NONPROFIT 
SECTOR 21 (2005) [hereinafter PANEL FINAL REP.]; PAUL C. LIGHT, HOW AMERICANS VIEW CHARITIES: A 
REPORT ON CHARITABLE CONFIDENCE, 2008, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2008/04/nonprofits-
light [http://perma.cc/B2ER-CDVG]; Swords, supra note 97, at 573-74. 
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recent IRS initiatives to reduce oversight at the application stage and discussing how best 
to evaluate the effects of such changes. 
A. Concerns and Proposals 
Concerns about the effectiveness of IRS oversight for exempt organizations are 
not new, as illustrated by the following passage from a 1977 report prepared under the 
auspices of the blue-ribbon Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs: 
 Recently the Service has acknowledged that in the exempt 
organizations area it fulfills a regulator rather than tax-collecting role.  
While troubled by the breadth of its responsibility in this area, in which 
the Service admits that “the tax collector has never been entirely 
comfortable,” those within the Service who specialize in exempt 
organizations . . . take this responsibility seriously and attempt to meet it 
fairly.  In doing so, these officials are somewhat handicapped by (a) 
cumbersome procedures which were designed generally to meet the needs 
of the tax-collecting branches of the Service; (b) inadequate authority in 
relation to other officials near the top of the Service’s hierarchy; (c) the 
understandable emphasis of the Service on its role as tax collector rather 
than as overseer of a non-revenue-producing activity; and (d) the generally 
weaker qualifications and training of the Service’s field staff as compared 
with the National Office staff.99 
More recently, the Panel on the Nonprofit Sector—organized in response to 
concerns raised by Congress with respect to IRS oversight of charities—stated that 
“[f]unding for federal and state oversight of tax-exempt organizations has become 
increasingly inadequate as the size and complexity of the exempt sector has grown.”100  
The National Taxpayer Advocate’s 2014 Annual Report to Congress noted that Taxpayer 
Advocate Services cases involving applications for recognition of exempt status have been 
increasing dramatically in recent years, demonstrating “that the IRS’s processes are 
creating significant hardship for both new organizations and those whose exempt status 
was automatically revoked.”101  These concerns were in addition to the more specific 
concerns regarding the handling of certain applications relating to political activity.102  
Finally, GAO issued a critical report at the end of 2014 highlighting how shrinking 
resources have made the IRS’s oversight of charitable organizations less extensive and 
more complicated.103  GAO also noted the need for the IRS to develop compliance goals 
and additional performance measures to assess the impact of its enforcement activities, 
while at the same time acknowledging the technical difficulty of doing so.104 
Proposals to address these concerns tend to fall into three categories: reorganizing 
the IRS to enhance the prominence of the exempt organizations function, increasing and 
improving procedures for gathering and analyzing information relating to exempt 
organizations, and increasing the financial and personnel resources devoted to the exempt 
organizations function.  For the most part, the IRS and Congress have already implemented 
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the first category of proposals.  In 1969, the IRS doubled the number of revenue agents and 
tax auditors assigned to exempt organization managers, provided them with special 
training, and centralized the consideration of such matters in key districts.105  In 1974, 
Congress created a new Office of Employee Plans and Exempt Organizations headed by 
an Assistant Commissioner within the IRS National Office, and the IRS in turn created a 
separate Exempt Organizations Division within that office as well as Employee Plans and 
Exempt Organizations offices within its regional and key district field offices.106  The next 
25 or so years saw some slippage with respect to the prominence and particularly the 
resources allocated to the exempt organizations function within the IRS.107  Nevertheless, 
when Congress reorganized the IRS in the late 1990s to shift from a geographic to a 
functional structure, it retained the prominence of the exempt organizations function within 
the IRS by making the new Tax Exempt and Government Entities (TE/GE) Division one 
of the four primary operating divisions, albeit the smallest in terms of budget and 
personnel.108  Within that division there is a separate Exempt Organizations (EO) office, 
headed by an EO Director who reports directly to the TE/GE Commissioner.109  Given the 
relatively small size of the exempt organization sector numerically and financially 
compared to individuals and businesses, any further increase in prominence within the IRS 
is both unlikely and difficult to justify.110 
The second category of proposals is illustrated by the increased obligations 
imposed on exempt organizations with respect to both the initial application and the annual 
information return detailed above.111  It is also illustrated by IRS efforts to concentrate 
examinations on certain potential problem areas, such as colleges and universities, credit 
counseling, hospitals, and political activity, as well as more recent proposals to improve 
data collection and analysis.112 
The third category of proposals, relating to increased resources, is perhaps the most 
common although also the least fruitful. 113   As detailed previously, the number of 
employees and the financial resources dedicated to the IRS’s exempt organizations 
function appears to have been relatively stagnant, even as the number, financial assets, and 
federal tax law applicable to such organizations has grown significantly.114  At the same 
time, there appears to be little congressional interest in increasing IRS funding.115 
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Realistically, not much more can be done with respect to increasing the 
prominence of the exempt organizations function within the IRS.116  Nor is a significant 
increase in resources for the exempt organizations function likely in the foreseeable future, 
given both the financial state of the federal government and the political unpopularity of 
the IRS.117  So while securing additional resources for this function will be revisited in Part 
IV as part of considering possibly moving this function out of the IRS, this Part will assume 
this function remains within the resource-constrained IRS as currently structured and 
focuses instead on the possibilities for improving the efficiency of IRS procedures. 
There is a rich academic literature discussing how to increase compliance with the 
tax laws, although it rarely reaches the relative backwater of exempt organizations.118  This 
literature discusses a variety of process-oriented methods that may be effective with respect 
to such organizations.119  This Part will first briefly explain why some methods that may 
be effective with respect to taxpayers generally have little potential with respect to exempt 
organizations before turning to those methods that have more promise.  This Part also 
focuses on methods that do not require changes in the substantive standards for exempt 
status.  The reason for this limitation is that recent attempts to enact such changes have 
only resulted in limited legislative enactments addressing specific, identified concerns as 
opposed to more comprehensive changes that could significantly impact compliance across 
all or most exempt organizations.120  Recent congressional tax reform proposals have also 
generally not reached the substantive laws governing exemption.121  In contrast, Congress 
has recently been willing to enact significant procedural changes relating to reporting and 
disclosure.122 
B. Methods Unlikely to Significantly Improve Oversight 
Some of the methods proposed to aid compliance with the federal tax laws are 
generally a poor fit for exempt organizations.  For example, increasing the regulation of or 
penalties on gatekeepers such as lawyers and accountants is unlikely to be particularly 
helpful.123  This is both because many exempt organizations do not use such gatekeepers 
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and because there is evidence that the exempt organizations most likely to have the 
resources to engage such gatekeepers, such as colleges, universities, and hospitals, 
generally have a high level of compliance with the applicable federal tax laws. 124  
Similarly, increasing the penalties for noncompliance imposed on the organizations or their 
managers would only enhance compliance if the organizations and their leaders are aware 
of those costs and believe there is a significant risk of discovery of non-compliance.125  
None of these facts appear to exist with respect to most exempt organizations; most such 
organizations lack expert advisors to inform them about potential penalties, usually 
because of resource constraints,126 and the current examination rate, and thus the risk of 
discovery is—and is known to be—very low.127 
Rewarding whistleblowers and encouraging private enforcement actions through 
enabling qui tam lawsuits are alternative methods for enhancing compliance with the 
federal tax laws without requiring increased governmental resources, since they enlist 
private parties to improve compliance. 128   The success of the existing federal tax 
whistleblowing program has been relatively limited, however, and has not generated much 
interest with respect to exempt organizations.129  Furthermore, rewards for whistleblowers 
(and qui tam suit filers) are usually a portion of the tax revenue collected as a result, which 
would not be particularly effective with respect to exempt organizations.  Insiders at 
charities and other exempt organizations may also be less inclined to engage in 
whistleblowing than employees of for-profit companies because of the potential harm to 
their organization’s mission and those who benefit from its activities.  Finally, the exempt 
organizations area may be particularly vulnerable to damaging harassment if such methods 
are available, given the controversial nature of some exempt organizations and their usually 
limited financial resources to defend themselves against false accusations. 
Two other methods that have improved compliance significantly, with respect to 
federal tax laws, are generally also a poor fit for the exempt organizations area.  The first 
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is the highly successful introduction of third-party information reporting (e.g., the well-
known Form W-2).130  In the exempt organizations area, there is no obvious third party to 
provide information relating to compliance, nor is it clear what information could be 
reported that would be particularly useful to the IRS.131  The other such method is the 
withholding of taxes owed by the source of the taxable income.132  However, for exempt 
organizations, there (usually) is no tax to withhold in the first place. 
Beyond these specific process-oriented methods, a significant portion of recent 
compliance literature discusses methods for shifting the attitudes of taxpayers from the 
apparently dominant norm of noncompliance with the applicable tax laws, generally 
through a “responsive regulation” approach. 133   This approach includes cooperative 
compliance efforts that seek to resolve potential IRS-taxpayer disputes in a more 
cooperative and efficient manner.134  Existing, albeit limited, evidence indicates that most 
exempt organizations and particularly the largest grouping of them (charities) already have 
a strong pro-compliance bias, however.135   There is therefore probably little room to 
strengthen pro-compliance norms among such organizations generally, and probably not 
much to be gained from cooperative compliance programs or similar techniques.136 
Finally, some of the other common methods proposed for improving compliance 
with the federal tax laws would require the IRS to have significantly more resources, which 
is not a realistic possibility in the foreseeable future for the reasons already discussed.137  
For example, more resources would be required to significantly increase guidance and 
other educational materials given the IRS-wide decline in guidance over the past several 
decades. 138   The same obstacle would apply to simply increasing the number of 
examinations (as opposed to changing examination methods to do more with less, 
discussed below).  Finally, significantly improving the technology used by the IRS would 
also require substantial additional resources.  Indeed, the Treasury Department has 
identified all three of these areas as priorities for the IRS, but the IRS has made little 
progress with respect to them precisely because of its shrinking budget.139 
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C. Methods with the Potential to Significantly Improve Oversight 
Several methods show more promise, however.  The IRS has already implemented 
one set of such methods by introducing procedures and a new form to streamline the 
application process for organizations seeking recognition of exempt status as described 
below.  Another set of such methods is greater reliance on resource-intensive examination 
techniques, such as correspondence audits, no-contact review of operations procedures, 
and the use of compliance data to better target examinations.  A third set of such methods 
is designed to improve disclosure and transparency to enhance media and public input with 
respect to exempt organizations, including during both the application and examination 
processes.  A final promising method would be requiring increased electronic filing. 
1. Streamlined Application Procedures 
The IRS recently made two significant decisions to streamline the application for 
recognition of exemption process.  The first of these decisions was the introduction of an 
expedited review process for applications submitted by organizations seeking exemption 
under I.R.C. § 501(c)(4), primarily to clear the backlog of such applications in the wake of 
the controversy over the handling of them.  The second was the introduction of the new 
Form 1023-EZ, a streamlined application form for certain organizations seeking exemption 
under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), along with streamlined procedures for all applications. 
a. Expedited Process for Certain I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) 
Applications 
Less than two months after the I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) application controversy exploded 
in May 2013, newly appointed acting IRS Commissioner Daniel Werfel issued an Initial 
Assessment and Plan of Action to address the crisis.140  A major component of the plan 
was the creation of a voluntary process for expediting I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) applications that 
had been pending for more than 120 days as of May 28, 2013 and in which the 
organizations had indicated that they may be involved in political campaign intervention 
or issue advocacy.141  For eligible applicants that chose to take advantage of this process, 
the IRS promised to grant their pending application within two weeks if an authorized 
official of the organization declared, under penalties of perjury, that the organization (1) 
had spent in each past year and would spend in the current year and each future year 60 
percent or more in terms of both expenditures and time (employee and volunteer) on 
activities promoting social welfare and (2) for each such year had spent or would spend 
less than 40 percent on participation or intervention in any political campaign on behalf of 
(or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.142  The IRS later expanded this 
program to give itself the option of inviting later filing organizations to make these 
declarations, and receive a favorable determination in return, if the IRS determined that the 
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only potential issues raised by the organization’s application were possible involvement in 
political campaign intervention or providing private benefit to a political party.143 
The program has achieved its short-term goal of clearing the backlog of 
applications raising political campaign intervention issues.  The IRS reported that as of 
August 2015 141 (97 percent) of the 145 organizations that were eligible for the expedited 
process had had their cases resolved, including 43 organizations that chose the optional 
expedited process, with the IRS issuing 108 favorable determination letters.144  Separately, 
the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) reported that of the 160 
applications for recognition of exemption under I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) that involved possible 
political activity and were open as of December 17, 2012, 149 applications had been closed 
as of March 2015 and the 11 remaining applications were either in litigation, in Appeals, 
or had received a proposed adverse determination.145 
b. New Form 1023-EZ & Streamlined Procedures 
In mid-2014, the IRS announced a new “Streamlined Application for Recognition 
of Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3)”—the Form 1023-EZ. 146   Only organizations 
anticipating relatively low annual gross receipts ($50,000 or less), owning total assets not 
exceeding $250,000, lacking a variety of other characteristics (such as being a church, 
school, or hospital), and not planning to engage in certain activities (such as credit 
counseling or maintaining donor advised funds) are eligible to use this new form.147  For 
the organizations that are eligible to use the new form, however, relatively minimal 
information is required and, most importantly, certain key requirements are deemed 
satisfied as long as an appropriate official of the organization attests that they have been 
met.  These requirements include whether the group’s organizing document contains 
required provisions (thereby avoiding the need to provide the IRS with an actual copy of 
that document), whether the group is organized and will be operated exclusively for 
permitted purposes (thereby avoiding the need to provide a narrative description of the 
group’s current and planned activities), and whether the group has not and will not conduct 
prohibited activities such as supporting candidates or providing a substantial private 
benefit. 148   The application also asks whether the organization will engage in certain 
permitted but limited or regulated activities, such as attempting to influence legislation, 
paying compensation to officers, directors, or trustees, and operating overseas.149 
The Form 1023-EZ grew out of streamlined procedures for processing applications 
for recognition of exemption under any I.R.C. § 501(c) paragraph.  The IRS first adopted 
these procedures for applications that had been pending for more than a year, but then 
extended these procedures to all pending applications, and finally to new applications as 
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well.150  Similar to the Form 1023-EZ, these procedures generally require attestations, as 
opposed to copies of organizing documents or narrative descriptions to resolve open issues 
if certain conditions are satisfied.151 
As with the optional expedited process for I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) applications, these 
changes appear to have achieved their short-term goal of clearing the backlog of I.R.C. 
§ 501(c)(3) applications.  GAO recently found that the IRS had reduced the inventory of 
all applications (the vast majority of which were presumably for recognition of I.R.C. 
§ 501(c)(3) status) from 65,718 at the end of fiscal year 2013 to 22,759 at the end of fiscal 
year 2014, and had closed 117,000 cases in fiscal year 2014 (or more than double the 
number of cases closed in the previous fiscal year).152  The IRS also separately reported 
that the streamlined procedures adopted for all applications had reduced the inventory of 
cases that were more than 270 days old from 54,564 in April 2014 to 4,791 in September 
2014.153  The IRS further noted that by December 26, 2014 it had received 20,103 Forms 
1023-EZ, representing approximately half of the applications under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) filed 
during the period the Form 1023-EZ had been available, and that, on average, the IRS 
processed Forms 1023-EZ in less than 30 days.154 
c. Criticisms and Evaluation 
The limited streamlined application process for certain I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) 
applicants, as well as the Form 1023-EZ and the broader streamlined process for all I.R.C. 
§ 501(c) applicants, have attracted their share of criticisms.  For the former, some 
commentators viewed it as “giveaway” by the IRS and questioned whether the IRS would 
have any appetite to later examine the returns of organizations that had taken advantage of 
this expedited process.155  Others criticized the IRS for not further clarifying the legal 
standards regarding what qualifies as political campaign intervention and for requiring at 
least 60 percent social welfare activity in order to take advantage of the process even 
though there was no clear legal authority imposing such a requirement.156 
As for the new Form 1023-EZ, even before its introduction the IRS Advisory 
Committee on Tax Exempt and Government Entities (ACT) recommended against 
developing it because of the important educational purpose that the Form 1023 served by 
forcing applying organizations both to consider deeply their activities, finances, and 
management and to recognize that they would be subject to a comprehensive regulatory 
regime.157  ACT was also concerned that such an abbreviated form would not supply 
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information needed by the IRS both to make an accurate determination regarding whether 
the applying organization qualified for exempt status and to spot potential abuse risks.158  
The National Association of State Charity Officials (NASCO) reiterated these concerns in 
April 2014, highlighting in particular the increased opportunity for fraud and the resulting 
heightened burden on federal and state regulators in the long-term. 159   The National 
Taxpayer Advocate (NTA) also criticized the IRS for introducing the Form 1023-EZ in its 
current form, and particularly for that form’s use of attestations in place of copies of 
organizing documents and a narrative statement of current and planned activities.160  While 
NTA had previously proposed the development of a Form 1023-EZ for use by certain small 
organizations, the Form 1023-EZ actually introduced by the IRS was developed without 
consulting the Taxpayer Advocate Service and went much further in reducing the 
information required than NTA had anticipated.161  Finally, a number of practitioners and 
other commentators also raised concerns about the Form 1023-EZ not providing sufficient 
information to the IRS, the applicant, or the public (if the IRS approves the application, 
which causes it to become public).162  While the focus of most critics has been on the Form 
1023-EZ, some of the same criticisms would also apply to the more general streamlined 
application procedures to the extent they rely on attestations. 
At this point there is no information on whether any of the groups that are seeking 
I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) exempt status and that took advantage of the new expedited process have 
acted contrary to their declarations, nor has the IRS announced any specific plans for 
follow-up examinations of such organizations.  There is some preliminary information 
regarding whether groups benefitting from the broader changes are in fact living up to their 
attestations, however.  According to NTA, when the IRS reviewed a representative sample 
of Forms 1023-EZ the approval rate for such applications was less than 80 percent, or well 
below the overall approval rate for such applications of 95 percent through December 26, 
2014.163  This approval rate is actually less than the overall approval rate prior to the 
introduction of the Form 1023-EZ and the streamlined procedures, which from 2010 
through 2013 ranged from 81.6 percent to 89.8 percent for applications filed under I.R.C. 
§ 501(c)(3). 164   This relatively low approval rate may indicate that the smaller 
organizations may actually be less likely to make it through the approval process, for 
whatever reasons (including not responding to IRS inquiries), than larger ones.165  NTA 
also reported that a non-representative check of organizational documents for a handful of 
Form 1023-EZ filers found that most had documents that did not meet the organizational 
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test under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) even though the applicants had attested they satisfied that 
test. 166   The IRS plans to select another sample of Form 1023-EZ filers for a post-
determination compliance program involving correspondence examinations in early fiscal 
year 2016.167 
While preliminary (and with respect to the organizational documents, anecdotal), 
these data are troubling.  Two other, related sets of data also raise concerns about the 
accuracy of self-reported information.  As noted previously, there are data indicating that 
exempt organizations’ annual returns often contain inaccurate information, even if usually 
unintentionally.168  There are also data indicating that a significant number of donors to 
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organizations who claim deductions for noncash contributions fail to 
properly substantiate those contributions and so may be claiming undeserved tax 
benefits.169  While such donors of course have a strong financial incentive to exaggerate 
the value of their contributions, exempt organizations also have incentives both to mask 
any possible noncompliance and to provide favorable but inaccurate financial 
information.170 
The IRS is facing a crisis in the form of a growing backlog of applications, driven 
in large part by reinstatement requests arising out of the congressionally mandated 
automatic revocation process, and lacks additional resources to devote to processing those 
applications.  Furthermore, if the vast majority of applicants are seeking exempt status in 
good faith and desire to comply with the applicable laws, as is likely the case, then it is 
overly burdensome to require all applicants to go through an overly lengthy process to 
identify a relatively small number of bad actors (contrary to the concerns raised by ACT 
and NASCO).  This is particularly true given that the application is ill-suited to ferreting 
out bad actors because much of the information provided is aspirational (what the 
organization plans to do, as opposed to what it has done or is doing) and the IRS is generally 
limited to considering the information provided by the organization itself, making 
deception relatively easy.171 
That said, even organizations that desire to comply with the applicable laws need 
their leaders to have both an understanding of those laws and incentives to make 
compliance a sufficiently high priority amongst the many competing demands for time and 
resources for new organizations.  Early indications are that new Form 1023-EZ has a 
significant failure rate in this regard, which does not bode well for the adoption of 
streamlined procedures that also rely on attestations.  This information suggests several 
areas where further evaluation is needed and, if that further evaluation confirms these 
concerns, the IRS should make improvements to both the Form 1023-EZ and the 
streamlined procedures. 
With respect to further evaluation, the IRS needs to complete its planned post-
determination evaluation of a statistically valid sample of Form 1023-EZ filers to 
determine whether in fact their attestations were accurate, including with respect to 
required organizational document provisions.  As important, the IRS, or an oversight group 
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such as the Government Accountability Office, NTA, or TIGTA needs also to do a similar 
evaluation of Form 1023 filers that used attestations to resolve outstanding issues with 
respect to their applications (which the IRS does not appear to currently be planning).  
While the IRS should also do an evaluation, with respect to politically active organizations 
seeking I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) status that successfully used the optional streamlined procedure, 
it is almost certainly not worth the effort from a tax compliance perspective, given the 
political sensitivity of asking such groups for additional information, the relatively small 
number of them, and the relatively small amount of tax at issue with respect to them 
(especially since they only receive exemption, not the ability to receive tax deductible 
contributions). 
If such evaluations reveal a significant level of noncompliance, as early indications 
imply they will, then both the Form 1023-EZ and the streamlined procedures need to be 
modified to sufficiently educate organizational leaders about the applicable laws and to 
reduce opportunities for noncompliance.  Possible methods for improving education 
include requiring applicants to review critical definitions and requirements before 
providing related attestations on the electronically filed form (as opposed to simply urging 
them to review the lengthy instructions for that form), providing FAQs for the form (which 
have not been released even though the form has now been available for over a year), and 
requiring applicants to complete the eligibility form electronically (with critical definitions 
and requirements readily available or required to be reviewed) as opposed to simply 
attesting that they have done so.172  While in theory it would be helpful if more applicants 
consulted experienced advisors during the application process, small organizations eligible 
to complete the Form 1023-EZ are unlikely to have been able to obtain such assistance 
even if they were still required to complete the Form 1023.173  Absent resources to aid such 
organizations in obtaining professional help, which the IRS is certainly not in a position to 
provide, it is necessary to better educate the organizational leaders who are almost certainly 
going to be primarily, if not exclusively, responsible for completing the forms. 
Possible methods for reducing noncompliance opportunities include requiring 
additional information to verify compliance (such as copies of organizational documents, 
if noncompliance in that area is found to be a significant issue) and selecting a substantial 
number of applications for close review within a certain time period after a favorable 
determination.174  For reasons already discussed, increasing the penalties on individuals 
who complete the form is less likely to be helpful. 175   The exact educational and 
compliance-enhancing methods chosen will ultimately depend, however, on the areas of 
significant noncompliance identified by the further evaluations. 
2. More Efficient Examination Techniques 
Because low examination rates are an issue for all types of taxpayers, 
commentators have suggested various techniques for more efficiently conducting 
examinations.  Such suggestions are particularly important for the exempt-organizations 
function, given the new streamlined application processes that reduce the level of initial 
oversight.  These techniques include a greater reliance on correspondence audits, better 
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targeting of examinations, and the expanded use of operations reviews that do not require 
direct contact with the organization at issue. 
Correspondence audits are conducted by mail and are in theory less burdensome 
for the IRS (and taxpayers) because they eliminate in-person meetings with, and on-site 
visits by, IRS employees.176  They also often are more focused than in-person examinations 
because they are limited to specific issues identified by IRS review of the taxpayer’s 
relevant return(s).177  The savings can be significant—the GAO recently estimated that the 
cost per case for an individual income tax correspondence audit is $274, compared to 
$2,278 for a field examination—in terms of IRS resources.178  Correspondence audits could 
potentially provide these benefits in the exempt organizations area as well.  In fact, 
approximately a quarter of the examinations that the Exempt Organizations Division 
completed in fiscal year 2012 were correspondence audits. 179   This proportion is 
significantly less than the three-quarters for individual audit.180 
Better targeting of examinations is usually accomplished by first examining a 
statistically valid sample of similar organizations to determine both overall levels of 
compliance and likely indicators or areas of significant noncompliance.181   Given the 
diversity of the exempt organizations area in terms of purposes, types of activities, financial 
size, and complexity, and therefore the likely variance with respect to levels and types of 
noncompliance, such targeting has the potential to increase the efficiency of IRS oversight 
of such organizations.  The IRS has in fact attempted to use these techniques in this area 
through the compliance projects cited previously, as well as other “market segment” 
efforts.182  The current Exempt Organizations Director recently announced plans to move 
instead to an issue-based approach. 183   The GAO has also reported that the IRS is 
considering additional areas for special focus with respect to Form 1023-EZ filers, 
including “legislative or overseas activities, compensation issues, and unrelated business 
activity.”184 
The Review of Operations (ROO) program involves IRS review of an exempt 
organization’s annual returns and of publicly available information, with limited or no 
contact with the organization at issue unless the organization is referred for an 
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examination.185  The IRS initiated this program in response to requests for a process to 
review all organizations several years after they successfully complete the application 
process, but as established, it also affects older organizations.186  Commentators have 
recently renewed calls for such a review in light of the streamlined application processes 
discussed above.187 
The primary advantage of correspondence audits and the ROO program is that by 
limiting or even eliminating IRS interactions with exempt organizations, the employee time 
and other resources devoted to each case are significantly reduced.  Recent studies of 
correspondence audits, conducted outside the exempt organizations area, indicate that this 
limitation results in at least two significant disadvantages, however.  First, communication 
with the targeted taxpayer is impaired, including through mail delivery failures,188 low 
taxpayer responsiveness,189 and a lack of taxpayer understanding regarding the process and 
any identified issues.190  This leads to significant taxpayer dissatisfaction191 and even, 
possibly, to violations of taxpayers’ rights.192  Second, such audits, at least in the individual 
income context, tend to be more superficial and less accurate than the field examinations 
that they displace.193  The latter concern also likely applies to the ROO program, given that 
it relies on IRS filings and publicly available information to identify possible 
noncompliance as opposed to documents and information requested from the exempt 
organization, as is the case for examinations. 
Greater selectivity with respect to examination targets would in theory permit the 
IRS to better detect significant pockets of noncompliance (particularly intentional 
noncompliance), and focus its limited examination resources on those areas.  In practice, 
however, successfully implementing such selectivity is difficult.  For example, NTA 
recently found that the IRS tends not to use the already available information to inform its 
examination process.194  In the exempt organizations area, the compliance projects noted 
earlier either have not been designed to incorporate a statistically valid sample of 
organizations of a particular type or engaged in a particular activity, or have ultimately 
failed to do so at the examination stage (rendering the examination results not 
representative and so of limited utility).195 
The IRS, therefore, needs to evaluate its existing exempt organization 
correspondence audit, ROO, and its selective examination programs to determine if the 
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criticisms have merit and, if so, can be resolved favorably.  If the same problems apply in 
the context of exempt organizations targeted for correspondence examinations, it appears 
most of the highlighted problems could be resolved by providing more accurate 
information to the targeted organizations regarding the examination process and timeframe 
and, most importantly, by providing the organizations with the ability to interact, at least 
by telephone, with the examining agent.196  While the latter change would be more costly, 
it appears that the IRS has given resource conservation too high a priority, resulting in 
unfair treatment of examination targets and in high levels of taxpayer dissatisfaction. 
With respect to accuracy and depth issues, if they exist in the exempt organization 
correspondence audit and ROO programs, they may represent an unavoidable trade-off for 
the resource savings those programs represent.  That trade-off puts even greater importance 
on gathering and applying data that can be used to selectively target examinations better, 
both to focus the issues addressed in those programs and to determine what issues or 
organizations require relatively resource-intensive field examinations as opposed to these 
less costly, but less thorough, reviews.  Here, the IRS needs to do a better job, even at an 
increased initial investment cost, at conducting statistically valid sampling of major exempt 
organization categories and activities, so that its limited resources can be better targeted in 
the future. 
3. Increased Disclosure 
Commentators have cited increased disclosure of information to the public as 
having the potential to enhance compliance with the federal tax laws both generally and 
specifically with respect to exempt organizations.197  This specific application is in large 
part because the normal presumption of confidentiality of taxpayer information does not 
generally apply for exempt organizations.198  Both the IRS and exempt organizations are 
required to make publicly available applications for recognition of exemption (after the 
application is granted) and annual information returns, with only relatively limited 
redactions permitted (e.g., donor information, trade secrets, etc.).199  Such disclosure has 
been enhanced both through the increasing amount of information required on these 
forms200 and through the efforts of private parties, particularly GuideStar, which makes all 
recent annual returns of exempt organizations available on the Internet.201 
Even given this high level of existing disclosure, commentators have identified 
several areas where greater disclosure could enhance compliance with little additional 
burden on the IRS.  One such area is that of pending applications, which are currently not 
subject to disclosure until the application is approved. 202   Another area is that of 
examinations, which are not subject to disclosure except that if the examination results in 
revocation of exempt status, that result is made public when it is finalized or litigated; but 
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even still, such a result is not widely disseminated.203  Other suggestions include enhancing 
information-sharing with state regulators, even if that information is not made available to 
the public.204 
Common advantages cited for increased disclosure with respect to taxpayers 
generally include shaming them into compliance;205 improving public perceptions of the 
level of compliance; the risk of noncompliance; 206  and, particularly for exempt 
organizations, vindicating the public’s right to know about entities that enjoy significant 
tax benefits.207  Increased disclosure also has the potential to provide enhanced oversight 
at little cost to the IRS by essentially enlisting the media and public in reviewing the 
disclosed information.208  Even commentators who are supportive of increased disclosure 
acknowledge various risks, however.  These risks include potential privacy harms, the risk 
of harassment for more controversial exempt organizations and their leaders, the risk of 
disclosing IRS examination selection criteria, the burden on the IRS of managing and 
enforcing disclosure rules, the burden on the exempt organizations themselves, and the risk 
of imposing extra-legal requirements.209 
Furthermore, disclosure by itself does not necessarily lead to increased oversight—
the media and public may choose not to use the revealed information or even to take the 
time to review it, and state regulators may have other enforcement priorities.210  At the 
same time, the IRS would have to manage any such disclosure system and deal with 
requests for exceptions based on claims of potential harassment or other legitimate 
grounds.  So while disclosure may improve the public accountability of the IRS, its actual 
effect on compliance is less certain and may not be worth even its modest burden on the 
IRS and exempt organizations.211  At a minimum, the IRS should take steps to evaluate 
whether, and to what extent, disclosure could enhance the detection of noncompliance. 
4. Increased Electronic Filing 
A related and widely shared recommendation is to increase the extent of required 
electronic filing by exempt organizations (“e-filing”).  Indeed, strong support for expanded, 
mandatory e-filing for exempt organizations is found not only throughout the federal 
government but also in the exempt sector itself.212  Currently, e-filing is required only for 
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the annual information returns filed by the largest organizations and for the Form 1023-EZ 
and Form 990-N, which only certain, relatively small exempt organizations may use.213 
Increased e-filing would enhance both public and IRS access to filed 
information.214  Increased e-filing may also have at least two other significant benefits.  
First, e-filing may prevent some common errors on both applications and annual returns, 
as well as help educate applicants about the applicable legal requirements, thereby aiding 
organizations that desire to file accurate forms but through inadvertent errors fail to do 
so.215  Second, expanded mandatory e-filing could enhance the ability of the IRS to target 
examination efforts as discussed above.  Currently, the IRS is limited in its use of 
information from electronically filed returns because it can only incorporate in computer 
analyses information that it also enters from non-electronically filed returns (in order to not 
disadvantage organizations that electronically file).216  If Congress required all exempt 
organizations to file their annual returns electronically, the IRS could instead analyze all 
of the submitted information.  A survey by the ACT found that few exempt organizations 
believe e-filing would be burdensome, so the only significant downside to increased 
mandatory e-filing would be the need for an initial investment by the IRS.217  As with the 
other methods discussed above, however, the IRS would still need to evaluate the results 
of electronic filing to determine if in fact it leads to the expected compliance benefits. 
* * * 
The above discussion demonstrates that there are a number of ways to improve 
compliance by exempt organizations with the applicable federal tax laws through more 
efficient oversight by the IRS.  In addition, enacting these various methods in tandem could 
create helpful synergies.  For example, e-filing could both make disclosure easier and 
enhance the ability of the IRS to target examinations.  None of these methods is without its 
disadvantages; however, there may be ways to offset or even eliminate them, such as by 
prioritizing organizations that take advantage of the streamlined application process for 
examination several years after IRS recognition of exemption. 
At the same time, there is no obvious solution.  Even if Congress, the Treasury, 
and the IRS were willing and able to enact, evaluate, and recalibrate all of these methods, 
as is necessary, it is far from clear that they would be able to significantly enhance 
compliance by exempt organizations with the applicable federal tax laws, given the current 
resource limitations faced by the IRS and the unlikelihood of significant changes to the 
substantive legal standards for exemption.  In a climate of pervasive concern regarding 
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possible bias in the IRS oversight of exempt organizations, more radical change is ripe for 
consideration—moving the oversight function out of the IRS completely. 
IV. RETHINKING THE LOCUS OF OVERSIGHT 
It is an unavoidable reality that the IRS is hobbled both by the awkwardness of 
adapting its revenue-collection culture and practices to the regulation of exempt 
organizations and by congressional hostility toward increasing the agency’s funding.218  As 
these cultural and resource concerns are far from new, commentators have proposed 
numerous alternatives to the IRS for housing the oversight role.219  Since at least the 1970s, 
none of these proposals has attracted much attention, acceptance or implementation.  The 
extremity of current circumstances both justifies and renders more realistic the pursuit of 
an alternative to the IRS, however. 
This Part briefly summarizes the proposals for an alternate, national overseer for 
exempt organizations.  A national body, as opposed to state or local bodies, is key because 
the oversight role flows from federal tax law.  This Part then considers the advantages and 
disadvantages that would likely arise from moving the exempt organization function out of 
the IRS into either a new federal agency or a new private, self-regulatory body (albeit one 
closely overseen by the federal government). 
A. Proposals for National Alternatives to the IRS 
Commentators have developed essentially three national alternatives to the IRS.220  
One proposal is the creation of a new federal regulatory agency.  A second is the creation 
of a federal advisory group.  The third is the creation of a national self-regulatory 
organization. 
1. New Federal Regulatory Agency 
Even as Congress reorganized the IRS in the 1970s to increase the prominence and 
resources available for the exempt organizations function, several commentators testified 
before Congress in support of a bolder move with respect to charitable (I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)) 
organizations: creating a new national entity.221  As later elaborated by others, the proposed 
agency would be structured along the same lines as the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), with commissioners appointed by the President and confirmed by the 
Senate for set terms.222  The agency would take over the application, examination, and 
guidance functions conducted by the IRS (except in instances where such organizations 
owed unrelated business income tax); would compile and publish data relating to 
philanthropic organizations and activities; and would advise both Congress and the 
executive branch on charitable matters.223   Others writing at the same time were not 
supportive of this proposal, however, preferring to put their faith in the then ongoing 
changes at the IRS.224  Joel Fleishman revisited this proposal in 1999 but only as a strategy 
                                                      
218 See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text. 
219 See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 8, 461-66; Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Brendan M. Wilson, 
Regulating Charities in the Twenty-First Century: An Institutional Choice Analysis, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
479, 495-504 (2010). 
220 See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 8, at 461-63. 
221 See Donald R. Spuehler, The System for Regulation and Assistance of Charity in England and 
Wales, with Recommendations on the Establishment of a National Commission on Philanthropy in the United 
States, in 5 COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS, RESEARCH PAPERS 3045 (1977). 
222 Id. at 3080. 
223 Id. at 3080-81. 
224 See Ginsburg et al., supra note 29, at 2642-44. 
114 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW [Vol.7:80 
of last resort if other, self-regulatory strategies had failed; he has since shifted his support 
to a national self-regulatory organization.225 
2. New Federal Advisory Group 
In the 1970s, two different commissions proposed a new federal advisory group.226  
Such a group would serve an information gathering and sharing role, and would craft 
recommended best practices and proposals for legislative and regulatory changes, but 
would not exercise any regulatory authority itself, leaving that role to the IRS and the 
states.227  These proposals also failed to gather sufficient support to advance, either then or 
since.228  Several private, national organizations have since arisen that serve in essentially 
this role, however, albeit without a government imprimatur.  The most prominent is 
Independent Sector, which organized the Panel on the Nonprofit Sector.229  Other such 
organizations include the Council on Foundations, the Evangelical Council for Financial 
Accountability (which organized the Commission on Accountability and Policy for 
Religious Organizations), and the National Council of Nonprofits.230 
3. New National Self-Regulatory Organization 
In 1999 Fleishman also put forward the idea of a private self-regulatory 
organization (“SRO”) that would investigate and report malfeasance by unscrupulous 
individuals or groups and propose best practices that go beyond legal requirements for 
well-meaning but perhaps unwise or careless groups and their leaders, either as an 
alternative or in addition to a joint private/public effort. 231   Former IRS Exempt 
Organizations Division Director Marcus Owens modified and further developed this idea, 
suggesting the creation of a quasi-public SRO that would work with the IRS in a similar 
manner to how the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) currently works with 
the SEC.232  His proposal would create an entity for which membership for organizations 
seeking to attain or maintain I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) status (or possibly any category of I.R.C. 
§ 501(c) tax-exempt status) would be mandatory and over which representatives of the 
regulated community would have influence but not control through a board divided equally 
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between sector representatives, governmental representatives, and independent “public 
directors.”233  The SRO’s focus would be on enforcing and interpreting the federal tax laws, 
but subject to the ability of the IRS to reject or amend proposed rules.234  As noted above, 
Fleishman has now endorsed Owens’s proposal.235 
B. Considering the Proposals 
Before considering the various proposals, it is necessary to determine what 
characteristics would be optimal for an oversight body charged with ensuring compliance 
by exempt organizations with the applicable federal tax rules.  As noted previously, the 
body should be national in scope.  Other desirable characteristics can be easily gleaned 
from both the critics of the IRS in this regard and the proponents of the various alternatives: 
an exclusive focus on overseeing exempt organizations; a realistic possibility of increased 
funding; a staff capable of impartial, accurate, and professional application of the pertinent 
federal tax laws; and systems and procedures that reflect a regulatory as opposed to a 
revenue-collecting focus.236 
The second option—a federal advisory body—is clearly inferior to the other 
possibilities for at least two reasons.  First, it would be duplicative of various private, 
advisory bodies that have arisen or grown in prominence since the 1970s.237  Second, 
because it is advisory in nature, its positions would not be binding on the regulated 
community and so it would be significantly limited in its ability to promote compliance.238 
The remaining possibilities raise two sets of advantages and disadvantages.  One 
set relates to moving the oversight function out of the IRS, even if it were to remain within 
the federal government.  The second set relates to moving that function out of the federal 
government to a private SRO, albeit one still tied to the federal government in various 
ways. 
1. Leaving the IRS 
The spin off of a regulatory function from an existing agency into a separate federal 
agency is unusual but not unprecedented.  For example, Congress spun the Federal 
Communications Commission off from the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) 
because the task of regulating telephone service had simply grown too great to leave as a 
secondary function of the ICC.239  In a similar way, it appears the exempt organization 
function has grown from a relatively small role for the IRS to a much larger one both 
because of the growth in the number and complexity of such organizations and because of 
increased oversight expectations on the part of Congress and the public.240 
Moving some or most of exempt organization oversight to a new federal agency 
would increase accountability for that oversight, since it would be the sole function of the 
new agency as opposed to only one function among many at the IRS.241  Such a move 
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would also permit the development of procedures and rules designed for the regulatory 
nature of this oversight, as opposed to the revenue-collection procedures and rules of the 
IRS, which include a presumption of taxpayer confidentiality and procedures that delay 
examinations until after the filing of an annual return.242  Furthermore, it would allow a 
reboot of the regulator’s relationship with the exempt organizations community, providing 
an opportunity to put the recent I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) application controversy firmly in the 
rearview mirror (and free the IRS from the risk of similar controversies in the future).243  
Finally, a stand-alone budget would highlight the relatively paltry amount of resources 
allocated to the exempt organization function and disassociate that function from the 
unpopular IRS and could lead to greater congressional appropriations.244 
Funding can, however, be a double-edged sword.  If the funding is done with 
appropriations of general treasury funds, that may both invite political interference by 
Congress and lead to instability.245  Common alternatives for independent agencies are 
dedicated funding from the regulated industry in one of two ways, either assessments of 
the regulated industry—for example, dedicating the private foundation investment income 
excise collections for the agency—or fees for services (such as the existing application 
fee).246  The latter approaches can both create stability and protect the agency from political 
interference, but are only available if Congress is willing to authorize them and thereby 
surrender this means of influencing the agency.  Self-funding also may increase 
presidential influence, particularly as exercised through the appointment process, as 
compared to congressional influence.247 
At the same time, such a departure may leave certain advantages behind.  Even 
with its battered reputation, a letter from the IRS has an in terrorem effect that a new agency 
would be hard-pressed to duplicate.  As part of the IRS, the exempt organization function 
also receives support in numerous ways from other parts of the federal government that 
would have to either remain available to the new agency or be transferred to it.248  At first 
glance, neither of these disadvantages appears particularly strong, however, especially 
since maintaining existing support (e.g., IRS service center processing of forms, the 
Department of Justice Tax Division’s litigation support) or assuming it (e.g., hiring in-
house attorneys to provide legal support in place of IRS Chief Counsel) appears to be 
achievable. 
Certain restrictions would continue to apply, however, including civil service rules 
and compensation levels that may inhibit the ability of the new agency to hire and retain 
qualified personnel.249   Similarly, procurement rules may limit the ability of the new 
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agency to obtain needed technology and outside expertise in the form of consultants.250  
Perhaps most importantly, it is not clear to what extent Congress would fund any new 
agency, particularly in these budget-conscious times.251  Finally, careful consideration 
would also have to be given regarding what portions of the Internal Revenue Code would 
become subject to the interpretation and enforcement of the new agency and what portions 
would remain with the IRS to minimize overlap and the resulting need for coordination.252 
2. Leaving the Federal Government 
The type of SRO proposed by Owens is one that would have mandatory (as 
opposed to voluntary) membership for all exempt (or at least charitable) organizations and 
would wield implementation and enforcement authority (including the ability to impose 
direct sanctions, unlike most private accrediting bodies). 253   The academic literature 
relating to SROs indicates there are four threshold requirements for successful execution 
of this type of SRO’s regulatory role.  First, the regulated community must support both 
the creation of the SRO and regulation by that SRO in the public interest, including through 
needed enforcement. 254   Second, the SRO must be able to apply legally enforceable 
sanctions to members of the regulated community who violate the applicable rules.255  
Third, the SRO must be able to secure sufficient resources, both in terms of funding and 
staff expertise, to fulfill its assigned role.256  Fourth, the government agency overseeing the 
SRO must have sufficient resources, including expertise, and incentives to be effective as 
an overseer.257 
The exempt organizations area appears to satisfy all four of these threshold 
requirements.  As already noted, exempt organizations, and particularly charities, generally 
have a strong interest in regulation that promotes the public’s interest in ensuring such 
entities satisfy the legal requirements for the tax benefits they receive.258  By conditioning 
tax exemption and, for charities, the ability to receive tax deductible contributions on being 
a member in good standing of the SRO and giving the SRO authority to enforce in court 
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any sanctions imposed for violations of the applicable rules, Congress can satisfy the 
second requirement. 259   Through the same mechanism, Congress can ensure that all 
organizations enjoying these federal tax benefits provide financial support to the SRO, 
which the SRO could use in turn to hire staff with the necessary expertise.260  The federal 
government currently collects from private foundations an amount that is two or more times 
the IRS Exempt Organizations Division budget through a very modest (no more than two 
percent) excise tax on investment income, so it should be an easy matter to construct a 
sliding scale dues structure that provides sufficient financial resources without unduly 
burdening the regulated community.261  Finally, the IRS has spent decades developing 
expertise in this area that could be deployed to provide the necessary government oversight.  
Its still-healing scars from the latest exempt organizations oversight failure should also 
provide sufficient incentive to provide adequate supervision of the SRO.262 
That said, moving the exempt organization function entirely out of the federal 
government to a self-regulatory body raises additional advantages and disadvantages, 
while sharing some but not all of the advantages and disadvantages of a new federal agency.  
The most important new advantage is the ability to generate financial support outside of 
the federal budget process.263  While some of the funding options discussed previously for 
a new agency could make that agency’s funding less vulnerable to political interference, 
an SRO would have greater separation from the political branches. 264   Another new 
advantage is freedom from civil service rules, which would permit the SRO to pay higher 
levels of compensation and more easily hire (and fire) employees than either the IRS or a 
new federal agency.265  Unlike a federal agency, a sufficiently private body would not be 
subject to constitutional restrictions on its activities or the Administrative Procedure Act, 
giving it more flexibility.266  At the same time, however, it is necessary to both limit 
constitutional challenges and bolster the legitimacy of the SRO by providing some level of 
due process and transparency. 267   Finally, a self-regulatory body with significant 
involvement by nonprofit organization leaders may result in greater cooperation between 
the regulator and the regulated community as well as greater regulated community buy-in, 
participation, and compliance.268  The reduced government involvement may also attract 
more political support for strong oversight.269 
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With respect to disadvantages, an SRO would not be able to directly impose 
criminal sanctions, but such sanctions are rarely used in the exempt organizations area and 
could still be accessible indirectly through referrals to the IRS Criminal Investigation 
Division.270  SROs also usually have a significant risk of inadequate oversight because of 
capture by the regulated community (or dominant players within that community), a risk 
that also exists with a separate federal agency but may be magnified with a private body 
that has closer formal and informal ties to the regulated industry. 271  In this context, 
however, the regulated industry leaders (and particularly prominent charities) likely are 
more amenable to having a strong and effective regulator than normally is the case for 
regulated communities because of their interest in the reputation of the exempt organization 
sector.272  In fact, one potential risk of an SRO is that if it is dominated by the largest and 
wealthiest tax-exempt organizations with a strong interest in preventing noncompliance, it 
could create a risk of over regulation that would unduly burden smaller, poorer, and less 
sophisticated organizations. 273   For example, the move of the IRS toward regulating 
governance, criticized in part because of the potential for ill-fitting one-size-fits-all rules, 
could be accelerated in an SRO dominated by leaders of the largest and wealthiest 
organizations (and encouraged by SRO officials seeking to increase their sphere of 
authority).274  Such a risk could be mitigated by sufficient involvement of representatives 
from smaller and less well-resourced exempt organizations and, as suggested by Owens, 
by not giving the SRO the ability to impose rules that went beyond those necessary to 
ensure compliance with the applicable federal tax laws.275  Another potential disadvantage 
is the reduced influence of the federal government and the public on the interpretation of 
statutory provisions, possibly leading those interpretations to be less responsive to political 
pressures than may be desirable.276  The IRS’ role likely could be adjusted to address this 
concern if it arose, however (as has happened with the SEC and the SROs it oversees). 
It is also unclear as to what extent a private body, even one with close ties to the 
federal government, could continue to benefit from various government support functions, 
but it may be possible to still take advantage of at least some of that support, especially to 
the degree it is essentially ministerial (e.g., processing filings).  Finally, a new SRO might 
also face a constitutional challenge to its authority. 277   That said, the constitutional 
questions generally relate either to a lack of clear legislative approval, a lack of sufficient 
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due process, or a lack of sufficient government oversight.278  It therefore should be possible 
to properly construct an SRO and its processes such that it should survive any such 
constitutional scrutiny. 
An SRO therefore appears to be a viable option and most of the disadvantages of 
leaving the federal government appear relatively minor in the context of the exempt 
organization function.  Furthermore, the advantages of leaving the federal government 
appear significant, particularly with respect to the ability to access greater resources and 
escape ill-fitting civil service and revenue-collection related rules. 
There is, however, one important caveat.  Most examples of national SROs 
wielding substantial authority in cooperation with a federal agency occurred in situations 
where the federal government was taking on a new regulatory responsibility and choose 
from the beginning to house that responsibility primarily in one or more SROs.279  In 
contrast, the regulation of exempt organizations through the federal tax laws is a 
longstanding and relatively mature regulatory role.  Moving that role to an SRO now could 
therefore raise certain additional concerns.  For example, the IRS has almost 900 
employees currently dedicated to exempt organization matters, and some of the support 
functions such as Chief Counsel also have a significant number of dedicated exempt 
organization employees.280  If the exempt organization function moved to a new federal 
agency, it might reasonably be expected that many of those employees, and particularly the 
ones with the greatest experience and expertise, could also be persuaded (or possibly 
required if they wanted to remain employed by the government) to move to that agency.  
Such an expectation seems less reasonable, however, if that function were to move to a 
private body that does not offer the same level of job security or benefits (including union 
representation) as a federal government position.281  Particularly, given this concern, it is 
far from clear how quickly a new SRO could staff up even with the aid of existing, 
voluntary self-regulatory bodies such as Independent Sector, which in turn could lead to it 
falling behind in the processing of the close to 90,000 applications and the hundreds of 
thousands of returns filed annually, not to mention the dozens of current guidance projects 
and other less formal education initiatives.282  While there are some existing organizations 
that develop and promulgate best practices and in some instances even provide 
certifications, none of them has developed to anywhere near the scale required to oversee 
all exempt organizations (or even all charities).283 
It would also take a major educational effort to familiarize the over a million 
existing exempt organizations, the millions of individuals who serve in leadership roles 
with such groups, and the numerous professionals that advise those organizations with the 
new regulatory structure.  For example, despite years of effort to communicate with smaller 
exempt organizations about the looming risk of automatic revocation, tens of thousands of 
such organizations apparently missed the message.284  And because such a shift appears to 
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be unprecedented, there are almost certainly other transition issues that would not be 
identified until after the transition was ongoing.  These identified and unknown risks are 
not necessarily fatal to the proposal to shift the exempt organization function to a private, 
self-regulatory body, but they strongly suggest further thought and research needs to be 
devoted to developing and planning for them before moving in this direction, as attractive 
as it may otherwise appear. 
There also are numerous implementation issues, some of which Owens addresses 
in his proposal.285  They include what functions would shift to the SRO with respect to 
application processing, examinations and other compliance initiatives, rulemaking and 
other guidance, and policy setting.  They also include whether the functions should be 
transferred over a period of time, both in order to better address the challenges of moving 
a mature regulatory role out of the federal government and to permit systematic evaluation 
of whether the transfer of each function has had positive results, and, if so, on what 
timetable.  Relatedly, Congress would need to determine the continuing role of the IRS and 
the Treasury Department with respect to the transferred functions.  Also, the above 
discussion assumed there would be a single SRO (with a broadly representative board), but 
it might make sense to instead have multiple SROs, each covering distinct types of exempt 
organizations (e.g., schools, hospitals).  Congress would also need to determine the extent 
of the SRO’s immunity from liability, both generally and with respect to antitrust laws 
specifically.286 
Again, none of these questions necessarily raise fatal issues.  They do, however, 
indicate how complicated and difficult shifting regulation of exempt organizations from 
the IRS to a non-governmental body likely would be.  Nevertheless, the increasing failure 
of IRS oversight detailed in Part II of this Article, the limited ability to improve that 
oversight given likely available resources described in Part III, and the potential benefits 
of moving the locus of exempt organization oversight to an SRO formed along the above 
lines all support pursuing development of such an entity. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The IRS oversight of exempt organizations with respect to their compliance with 
applicable federal tax laws has reached a breaking point.  Absent significant changes, the 
public’s confidence both in the ability of the IRS to provide such oversight and in the good 
behavior of exempt organizations themselves will almost certainly continue to decline.  
And that decline may soon reach a point, if it has not already, that threatens both the IRS’s 
ability to fulfill its primary, revenue-collecting responsibilities and the public support on 
which most exempt organizations rely. 
Even with its current resources and with no changes in the applicable substantive 
law, there are several ways in which the IRS could improve its oversight of exempt 
organizations.  These ways include continuing to use streamlined application procedures, 
increasing the efficiency of the examination process, ensuring greater disclosure of relevant 
information, and expanding electronic filing requirements.  Particularly if enacted together 
and carefully evaluated and recalibrated as necessary to maximize their impact on 
compliance, these methods have the potential to help the IRS do more with less. 
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But given the resource constraints faced by the IRS and the continuing growth of 
the exempt organization sector, it is unlikely that these methods will be sufficient to attain 
an acceptable level of oversight for exempt organizations.  The time is therefore ripe to 
consider bolder but riskier proposals to shift the oversight of exempt organizations outside 
of the IRS.  While a new federal agency has certain advantages, a new self-regulatory body 
that operates under the close supervision of the IRS appears to be a significantly better 
candidate for obtaining funding and freedom needed to substantially increase this oversight 
and therefore compliance with the federal tax laws applicable to exempt organizations.  
While the risks of moving this mature regulatory role out of the federal government are 
substantial and not completely known, such that any such move would require careful 
consideration of what functions would move out of the IRS, how such a transition would 
be sequenced, and how it would be evaluated, it is time to pursue this option. 
